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This order is binding on the parties16 and court unless modi-
fied at trial to prevent manifest injustice. 17
PROCEDURE
THE RULE-MAKING POWER
Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to enforce the
provisions of a statute' providing that when a trial judge
failed to determine an issue of law or fact within ninety
days after taking same under advisement, any party was
entitled to apply for withdrawal of the issue from the judge
and for appointment of a special judge to take jurisdiction
of the case. The trial judge refused petitioner's application.
Held: Writ denied. Statute is an unconstitutional legislative
interference with the judicial function.2 State ex rel Kostas
v. Johnson, 69 N.E.(2d) 592 (Ind. 1946).
In 1923, when the statutory provision involved in the
principal case was enacted, there was general acquiescence in
the power of the legislature to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure, 3 although a strong inclination to the contrary
had been indicated by the Indiana Supreme Court.4 However,
the legislative power was always subject to constitutional
limitations to prevent interference with action of the courts
16. Where it was stipulated by pre-trial order that a contract was
made in Florida but at the trial there was evidence from which
it could be inferred that the contract was made in Texas, the court
held that the stipulation was binding since the order was not
modified, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Olvera, 119 F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941). Accord, Gurman
v. Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.(2d) 717 (1939);
E. Dunkel, Inc. v. Barletta Co., 302 Mass. 7, 18 N.E.(2d) 377 (1937).
17. It has been held that in order to prevent manifest injustice the
trial judge in the exercise of his judicial discretion may: permit
amendments or corrections of mistakes in the pleadings, McDowall
v. Orr Felt & Blanket Co., 146 F.(2d) 136 (C.C.A. 6th, 1945);
discharge stipulations entered into under a misapprehension, Gur-
man v. Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.(2d) 717
1939); or improvidently made, Capano v. Melchinno, 297 Mass. 1,
7 N.E.(2d) 593 (1937).
1. Ind. Acts 1923, c. 83, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946)
§2-2102.
2. Ind. Const. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 7, § 1.
3. Smythe v. Boswell, 117 Ind. 365, 20 N.E. 263 (1888); Fletcher
v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458 (1865).
4. Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190, 131 N.E. 518 (1921); Soli-
meto v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919); Parkison v.
Thompson, 164 Ind. 609, 73 N.E. 109 (1905).
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in the exercise of their judicial function.5 It seems clear
that the statute in the principal case violated these limitations
when enacted.6
5. Consistent with the general rule in the United States under the
doctrine of separation of powers. Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360,
129 P. (2d) 308 (1942); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646(1936) ; In Re Constitutionality of Sect. 251.18, Wisconsin Statutes,
204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); Note (1945) 158 A.L.R. 705,
713.
6. The permissible extent of legislative interference with judicial
procedure has been frequently litigated in Indiana in the past.
In Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190,194, 131 N.E. 518,519 (1921)
it was observed that "There is probably no state in the Union
where so much has been said in the decisions on the subject of
practice as in this state." It has been held that the legislature
may exeed its procedural rule-making powers in prescribing re-
quirements for briefs, Solimeto v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E.
578 (1919); Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190, 131 N.E. 518
(1921); in requiring members of the Supreme Court to prepare
syllabi of decisions rendered, In Re Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20
N.E. 513 (1889); in restricting a court's power to punish for
contempt, Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570, 25 N.E. 818 (1890);
Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556 (1886); Little v. State,
90 Ind. 338 (1883), (although the legislature could regulate with-
in limits the procedure for contempt cases) Mahoney v. State, 33
Ind. App. 655, 72 N.E. 151 (1904); and in regulating the pro-
cedure on appeals where appellate jurisdiction is restricted, Sea-
gram and Sons v. Board of Commissioners, 220 Ind. 604, 45 N.E.
(2d) 491 (1943); Warren v. Ind. Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26
N.E.(2d) 399 (1940); City of Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 5
N.E. (2d) 501 (1936) ; Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86, 102 N.E. 497
(1913), (although it may prescribe such procedure) Stocker v. City
of Hammond, 214 Ind. 628, 16 N.E.(2d) 874 (1938); Hunter v.
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 202 Ind. 328, 174 N.E. 287
(1930); Lake Erie and W. Ry. v. Watkins, 157 Ind. 600, 62
N.E. 443 (1902); State v. Rockwood, 159 Ind. 94, 64 N.E. 592(1902). Compare State ex rel Ennert v. Hamilton Circuit Court,
223 Ind. 418, 61 N.E. (2d) 182 (1945) for the most recent position
of the court as to procedure on appeals. The legislature can
abolish the issuance of writs of error, Pittsburgh, C. C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Hoffman, 200 Ind. 178, 162 N.E. 403 (1928); Mont-
gomery v. Jones, 5 Ind. 526 (1854); Hornberger v. State, 5 Ind.
300 (1854).
The legislature cannot properly remove, disqualify, or grant
a change of judge in a certain case, State ex rel Youngblood v.
Warrick Circuit Court, 208 Ind. 594, 196 N.E. 254 (1935); indi-
rectly restrict judicial power to appoint counsel for paupers,
Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29
N.E.(2d) 405 (1940), (although it had previously been held to
the contrary) Board of Commissioners v. Moore, 93 Ind. App.
180, 166 N.E. 779 (1931); Board of Commissioners v. Mowbray,
160 Ind. 10, 66 N.E. 46 (1903); enact a statute granting a new
trial, Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301 (1853); although it could
regulate and place restrictions on procedure for new trials and
the right to a new trial, Amacher v. Johnson, 174 Ind. 249, 91
N.E. 928 (1910). Statutes cannot prescribe requirements for rec-
ords on appeal, Davis v. State, 189 Ind. 464, 128 N.E. 354 (1920);
Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 271, 64 N.E. 855 (1902) (Procedure
as to bills of exceptions); Adams v. State, 156 Ind. 596, 59 N.E.
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cilitate the judicial process and to avoid uncertainty as to
the proper rules of procedure within the state-court system1 8
Such uncertainty is not avoided when the impression is per-
mitted to prevail that the rules of procedure previously hav-
ing their sanction in legislative enactment are now sanctioned
as rules of the Supreme Court, only to discover that the court
"amends its own 'rules" by declaring legislation of long
standing unconstitutional.
RENT CONTROL
NECESSITY OF COMPLYING WITH RENT REGULATIONS
Suit by tenant against landlord for rent-overcharge penalty.
D attempted to show he had given P the required notice of
increase and that the new rent was justified as not being
more than P collected for the premises from subtenants.
Judgment for P. Held: Affirmed. Martino v. Hotzworth,
158 F.(2d) 845 (C.C.A. 8th, 1947).
This case illustrates the requirement for strict compli-
ance with the Maximum Rent Regulations. There are a few
exceptions,' but mere "substantial performance" is ordinarily
inadequate.2 The general rule applies to the popularly termed
"rent decontrol" for transient rooms.3 Before the landlord
can possibly qualify for decontrol, he must first file a supple-
mental registration statement so the Rent Director can classi-
which could be and was held to have been waived in that case,
without reference to the constitutionality of the statute.
18. The responsibility of the court seems increasingly important where
the legislature has actually abandoned the procedural field and
corrective measures are possible only through court rules. For
a discussion of the general theories of the rule-making power, see
1 Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3rd ed. 1943) § 226.
1. Hotel Enterprise v. Porter, 157 F.(2d) 690 (Ct. Em. App., 1946)
(illness of manager excused late application for rent adjustment) ;
Peters v. Porter, 157 F. (2d) 186 (Ct. Em. App., 1946) (require-
ment of re-registration after remodeling so concealed in the lan-
guage of the regulations that they were not apparent to landlord
of reasonable intelligence).
2. Ambassador Ap'ts. v. Porter, 157 F.(2d) 774 (Ct. Em. App.,
1946) (foreign residence and ignorance of procedural regulations
of persons controlling corporate landlord held no excuse) ; Bowles
v. Meyers, 149 F.(2d) 440 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945) mere belief that
the order is invalid does not excuse).
3. Rent Regulations for Transient Hotels, Residential Hotels, Room-
ing Houses and Motor Courts, Amend. 102, 12 Fed. Reg. 395 (Jan.
18, 1947).
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